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Notes
The Regulation by the Investment
Company Act of 1940 of
Small Business Investment
Companies Established Under
the Small Business Investment Act
In recent years, a difficult problem has emerged in-
volving the question of whether Small Business Invest-
ment Companies formed under the Small Business In-
vestment Company Act of 1958 should be subject to the
regulatory provisions of the Investment Company Act of
1940. The solution to this problem necessarily requires
an understanding of (1) the purpose of the two acts and
(2) the historical setting in which each was enacted. The
author of this Note has therefore first discussed this back-
ground material and thereafter proceeded to analyze spe-
cific problem areas encountered by Small Business In-
vestment Companies who attempt to comply with the
regulatory provisions of the Investment Company Act of
1940. He concludes that only by giving the Small Busi-
ness Investment Division complete responsibility for the
regulation of Small Business Investment Companies will
the latter be effectively controlled and promoted.
INTRODUCTION
As early as the 1930's, it became apparent that the growth and,
indeed, the very existence of small business was threatened by the
unavailability of long term loans and equity financing.' This "in-
vestment gap"2 in the economy was due in large part to the fact
1. H.R. REP. No. 2060, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1958).
2. The term "investment gap" has been used to designate the gap in our
economy's long term financial mechanism whereby little long term capital
flows into small business. See H.R. REP. No. 2060, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.
5 (1958).
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that no financial institution existed which was capable of furnish-
ing adequate financial aid to small business.3 Although many in-
dividual investors concentrated their investments in this area, they
were not able to furnish the large quantities of capital required by
small business which a large institution would be able to supply."
In an attempt to remedy this situation, Congress in 1958 passed
the Small Business Investment Act (SBIA).' The SBIA sought to
encourage the formation of small business investment companies
(SBICs) whose primary function was to furnish long term loans
and equity financing to small business concerns.'
3. See ibid.; McCallum, The Small Business Investment Act of 1958-Its
First Year of Operation, 45 VA. L. REv. 1039 (1959). For example, com-
mercial banks were unable to fulfill this financial need because their main
function was to provide short term and intermediate term capital. See S.
REP. No. 1652, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1958). Also, Small Business Ad-
ministration loans were limited to ten years with a possible ten year ex-
tension which did not satisfy small business long term needs. Ibid. Further-
more, the use of a public issue by a small business was usually impossible
because of its cost and the fact that it was difficult for a small business
to gain public acceptance of its securities. See McCallum, supra. Studies
by the SEC indicate that the cost of having a public stock issue is
all but prohibitive when the amount of the issue is less than $1,000,000.
Comment, 25 BROOKLYN L. Rnv. 39, 40 (1958).
4. One reason that institutional sources of equity and long term loans
failed to develop was that many investors were not willing to assume the
risk usually inherent in small business loans. Normally, small businesses have
limited access to physical resources and to markets for their goods. Also,
their management and production knowhow is usually more limited than is
the case with larger businesses. As a result, loans to a small business are
risky because their use of investment funds may be much less efficient and
productive than larger businesses. However, federal surveys and reports
have indicated that even small businesses with good credit risks found it
almost impossible to obtain adequate equity and long term loans. Murphy
& Netter, The Small Business Investment Act of 1958, 19 FED. B.J.
162, 164 (1959). The inability of these small businesses to obtain financing
was due in large part to the lack of a motivating force to channel the flow
of funds into deserving small businesses. See S. REP. No. 1652, supra note
3, at 3, 5. Congress sought to supply this motivating force through SBICs
formed under the SBIA.
5. 72 Stat. 689, 15 U.S.C. §§ 661-96 (1958), as amended by 74 Stat.
196, 15 U.S.C. §§ 662, 681, 682, 684 (Supp. II, 1961).
The policy and purposes of the SBIA are clearly stated in the following
excerpt from the act:
It is declared to be the policy of the Congress . .. to improve and
stimulate the national economy in general and the small-business seg-
ment thereof in particular by establishing a program to stimulate and
supplement the flow of private equity capital and long-term loan funds
which small-business concerns need for the sound financing of their
business operations and for their growth, expansion, and moderniza-
tion, and which are not available in adequate supply ....
72 Stat. 689, 15 U.S.C. § 661 (1958).
6. See 72 Stat. 689, 15 U.S.C. § 661 (1958). The term "small business
concern" is defined by the regulations of the Small Business Investment Di-
vision as follows: " 'Small business concern' means one which is independ-
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Many SBICs organized under the SBIA come within the regu-
latory provisions of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the
1940 act). 7 The purpose of the 1940 act was to protect the funds
of investors in investment companies from misuse by the managers
of these companies.s However, many businessmen-especially
those interested in the organization and promotion of SBICs-as-
sert that SBICs should be exempt from the 1940 act.' Their con-
tention is that the SBIC and the type of investment company sought
to be regulated by Congress through the 1940 act differ so greatly
in purpose and operation that the former cannot be promoted or
regulated effectively by the 1940 act.'"
The purpose of this Note is to discuss the desirability and feas-
ibility of exempting SBICs from the 1940 act. Two introductory
sections will present a background for this discussion. The first
section will deal with the provisions and operation of the SBIA
and the second will consider the application of certain regulatory
provisions of the 1940 act to the SBIC.
I. THE PROVISIONS AND OPERATION OF THE
SMALL BUSINESS INVESTMENT ACT
A. THE ESTABLISHMENT, CAPITAL STRUCTURE, AND OPERATION
OF THE SBIC
The SBIA established the Small Business Investment Division
(SBID) of the Small Business Administration for the purpose of
licensing" and regulating SBICs.' 2 An SBIC may be formed by
a minimum of ten persons' 3 who must first submit a "proposal"
ently owned ... and not dominant in its field of operation." 13 C.F.R.§ 107.103-1 (1959). See ibid. for a further definition of the term.
7. See 54 Stat. 789 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a (1958).
8. See S. REP. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 6-8 (1940); H.R. REP.
No. 2639, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 10 (1940).
9. See, e.g., Hearings on Small Business Amendments of 1959 Before
a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 86th
Cong., lstSess. 162 (1959).
10. Ibid.
11. 72 Stat. 691, 15 U.S.C. § 681(c) (195:3). See McCallum, supra note
3, at 1040-42 for a discussion of the procedure by which SBICs are li-
censed.
Probably two of the most important reasons that investment companies
desire to be licensed are (1) licensed companies can obtain funds from the
SBA and,(2) tax advantages are afforded to both licensed companies and
their investors. See notes 22-27 infra and accompanying text and note 99
infra for a further discussion of these advantages.
12. See 72 Stat. 694, 15 U.S.C. § 687(c) (1958).
See part (c) of § 687 for a discussion of the regulatory and examining
powers of the SBID.
13. 72 Stat. 691, 15 U.S.C. § 681(a) (1958).
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to the SBID which requests permission to proceed with the forma-
tion of a company. 4 The SBID is given discretionary power to de-
termine whether it should grant permission to proceed.'8 In ex-
ercising its discretion, the SBID is to be guided by the following
test: will the SBIC make a sound contribution to small business
financing?'" The proposed SBIC must incorporate under state
law and may conduct only those activities prescribed for such
entities by the SBIA.' If permission to proceed is granted, the
proposed SBIC is entitled to apply for a license to operate under
the SBIA.'5 After the SBIC has complied with any conditions
set forth in the SBID's approval letter and has filed the additional
information required by the license application, the SBIC may be
licensed. 9 The SBIC is usually formed for a period of 30 years
14. The "proposal" must contain such information as the SBIC's pro-
posed policies, operation plans, and capital structure. See 13 C.F.R. § 107.-
201-2(b) (1959) for a complete list of the contents of such a proposal.
15. 72 Stat. 691, 15 U.S.C. § 681(c) (1958).
16. In exercising that discretion some of the factors the SBA must
consider are: (1) the need for small business financing in the area in which
the proposed SBIC is to operate; (2) the general character of the manage-
ment of the proposed SBIC; (3) the number of similar companies already
formed in the United States; and (4) the business volume of such compa-
nies. Ibid.
17. 13 C.F.R. §§ 107.201-2(d)-(e) (1959). The SBICs' articles of incor-
poration are subject to the approval of the SBID. 72 Stat. 691, 15 U.S.C.
§ 681(b) (1958).
The act gave the SBID authority to charter SBICs until June 30, 1961
if it found a company could not be chartered under the laws of a particular
state. 72 Stat. 691, 15 U.S.C. § 681(a) (1958). After that date, all SBICs
must be chartered under state law. Murphy & Netter, supra note 4, at 167.
However, it seems clear that an SBIC would have little trouble incorpo-
rating under Minnesota law. Minnesota corporation law states specifically
that a corporation, when it is so provided in its articles of incorporation,
may acquire, hold, or dispose of the shares, bonds or other evidences of
indebtedness of any domestic or foreign corporation. MINN. STAT. § 301.-
10 (1957). Presumably under this section, an SBIC could be formed for
the purpose of financing small business corporations. However, it is not
clear from this section that an SBIC could lawfully finance unincorporated
small businesses. On the other hand, another provision of the Minnesota
corporation laws states that a corporation may be formed for any lawful
purpose. MINN. STAT. § 301.03 (1957). Hence, an SBIC could probably
finance unincorporated small businesses.
18. See 13 C.F.R. § 107.201-2(i) (1) (1959). The SBID may also reject
the proposal or give notice to the interested parties to furnish further in-
formation establishing that approval is warranted. 13 C.F.R. § 107.201-2
(i) (2) (1959).
19. 13 C.F.R. § 107.201-3(c) (1959). The licensed SBIC has powers
similar to other corporations; these include the power to contract, to sue,
and to be sued. See 72 Stat. 691, 15 U.S.C. § 681(d) (1958) for a
complete list of the powers possessed by the licensed SBIC.
Generally, three types of SBICs have been formed under the SBIA.
First, there is the type formed for the purpose of developing a certain
geographical area. This type of SBIC is usually initiated by individuals or
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with the right to extend for another 30 years if two-thirds of its
shareholders approve.2"
The financial structure of an SBIC consists of two levels. First,
there is the equity level which includes paid-in capital and surplus.
Before receiving a license, a proposed SBIC must submit evidence
to the SBID that it has paid-in capital and surplus of at least $300,-
000.21 The SBIA authorizes the Small Business Administration to
furnish $150,000 of this capital to each licensed SBIC by the pur-
chase of its debentures.22 These debentures must be subordinated
to other debenture bonds, to promissory notes, and to other obli-
gations issued by the SBIC.23 The availability of this source of
capital is a great aid to the beginning SBIC because it is not forced
to rely solely on funds from private investors. However, the regu-
lations of the SBID make it clear that the Small Business Adminis-
tration may furnish capital funds only to the extent that such
funds are not available to the SBIC from private sources.24
The debt level is a second means by which SBICs can gain in-
vestment resources by issuing debenture bonds, promissory notes,
and other obligations under such conditions and limitations as the
SBID shall provide.25 Debt financing enables those in control of
organizations interested in attracting industry to their area and helping ex-
isting industry to expand. Profit motive is of secondary importance for
these SBICs. A great many of these companies are state and local develop-
ment companies which may qualify under the SBIA. A second type is the
SBIC formed as a concomitant to an existing business activity or to aid
in the development of a specific industry. An example of this type is the
bank which organizes an SBIC to gain more flexibility in its operations
and to be able to furnish more services to its customers. For example, an
SBIC would be able to furnish equity capital to small business-an activity
which the bank itself cannot undertake.
A third type-which is probably most important from the standpoint of
amount of aid furnished to small business-is organized primarily to fur-
nish venture capital to small business offering promising growth potential.
High potential profits together with desirable income tax consequences for
high income taxpayers are the two principal attractions to possible investors
in this type of SBIC. See McCallum, supra note 3, at 1042-43; Murphy
& Netter, supra note 4, at 163-64.
20. 72 Stat. 691, 695, 15 U.S.C. §§ 681(d)(2), 687(f) (1958).
21. 72 Stat. 692, 15 U.S.C. § 682(a) (1958); 13 C.F.R. § 107.201-5(c)
(1959).
22. See 72 Stat. 692, 15 U.S.C. § 682(a) (1958).
23. Ibid.
24. See 13 C.F.R. § 107.302 1(c) (1959). See id. at § 107.303-2(a).
This regulation implements the clear policy of the SBIA which is to en-
courage the SBICs to make maximum use of private sources of capital.
See 72 Stat. 689, 15 U.S.C. § 661 (1958); S. REP. No. 1652, supra note
3, at 14; H.R. REP. No. 2060, supra note 2, at 7.
The SBID also has authority to limit the holdings of any individual,
group, or class in a particular SBIC. 72 Stat. 692, 15 U.S.C. § 682(c)
(1958).
25. 72 Stat. 692, 15 U.S.C. § 683(a) (1958).
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the SBIC to obtain additional funds without losing control because
such securities are non-voting. In addition, this method of financ-
ing increases the earning potential of equity securities because
debt securities do not share in the SBIC's earnings above their
fixed rate of return. Thus, the benefit of income from debt funds
in excess of their fixed rate of return is realized solely by the
equity security holders. However, SBID regulations limit the use
of debt financing by providing that the ratio of an SBIC's out-
standing indebtedness to paid-in capital and surplus shall not ex-
ceed four to one.26 Furthermore, the Small Business Adminis-
tration is authorized to lend money to an SBIC by purchasing its
debt securities to the extent of 50 per cent of the particular SBIC's
capital and paid-in surplus.2
B. THE PROCESS BY WHICH SBICs FINANCE SMALL BUSINESSES
In fulfilling its primary function, the SBIC provides private
equity capital and long term loans to small business concerns for
the purpose of promoting their general business operation, growth,
and modernization. Long term loans may be made to incorporated
or unincorporated small businesses for a term of 20 years
with the possibility of having the loan extended for an additional
ten years.28 The maximum rate of interest on such loans is deter-
mined by the SBID.29 Within this framework the terms of the
long term loan agreement are left to negotiation between the SBIC
and the small business interested in obtaining funds. The SBIA
provides that equity financing may be furnished "in such manner
and under such terms as the small business investment company
26. 13 C.F.R. § 107.303-1(a) (1959).
27. 72 Stat. 693, 15 U.S.C. § 683(b) (1958).
For purposes of determining the total capital and paid-in surplus of an
SBIC, the money received by an SBIC through the debenture purchases of
the SBA referred to in the text accompanying note 22 supra is considered
part of the paid-in surplus and capital of the SBIC. 72 Stat. 692, 15 U.S.C.
§ 682(a) (1958).
28. See 72 Stat. 693, 15 U.S.C. § 685 (1958). The statute provides
that the ten year extension may be used if orderly liquidation of the loan
will thereby be aided.
29. Ibid. The SBID regulations provide that the maximum rate of in-
terest on an SBIC loan to a small business shall not exceed the maximum
rate applicable to such a loan under local law. If no maximum rate exists
under local law, the maximum rate chargeable by an SBIC shall be set
forth in its proposal for review by the SBID. See 13 C.F.R. § 107.305-1(e) (1959). At the present time, SBID regulations prohibit the cost of funds
loaned to small businesses from an SBIC to exceed 15%. This cost not
only includes interest but also such expenses as investigation fees which are
charged to the borrowing small business. S. REP. No. 1293, 86th Cong., 2d
Sess. 20 (1960).
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may fix in accordance with the regulations of the administration."3
The applicable SBID regulations provide that the terms and con-
ditions of furnishing equity are left to negotiation between the
SBIC and the small business involved unless these terms represent
major variances from the investment policies stated in the SBIC's
proposal.3 If such a variance exists, the resulting agreement is
subject to the approval of the SBID.32 The SBID regulations gov-
erning equity financing benefit both the SBIC and small business
because they allow sufficient flexibility; that is, the individual needs
of the small business may be considered. As a result, SBICs are
able to perform their function of stimulating small business activ-
ity.
C. THE FUNCTION OF THE SBID
The primary function of the SBIID is to regulate SBICs.3 3 The
scope of its supervision is divided into two general areas. First,
SBID regulations govern the organization and operation of the
SBIC. For example, as noted earlier, fte SBID has authority to
license the SBIC,34 to approve or disapprove its articles of incor-
poration,' and to provide conditions and limitations on its au-
thority to lend money.36 In addition, the SBIC must obtain the
approval of the SBID before it can invest more than 20 per cent
of its capital and surplus in any single enterprise.3 By this type of
regulation, the SBID seeks to insure that the SBIC will effectively
carry out the purposes of the SBIA. Second, certain SBID regula-
tions are designed to protect the interests of SBIC investors. To
illustrate, the SBID, by regulation, prohibits those in control from
30. 74 Stat. 196 (1960), 15 U.S.C. § 684(a) (Supp. II, 1961).
Before any capital is provided to a small business, the SBIC may re-
quire a refinancing so that it holds the small business' total indebtedness.
The SBIC can also require that the small business give it first option to
finance any additional indebtedness. 74 Stat. 196 (1960), 15 U.S.C. § 684
(b) (Supp. H, 1961).
Prior to this amendment, convertible debentures were the only means by
which SBICs could furnish equity to a small business concern. 72 Stat. 693
15 U.S.C. § 684(b) (1958). See generally U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
223 (1960) for a discussion of the reasons for the amendment.
31. 25 Fed. Reg. 5478-79 (1960), amending 13 C.F.R. § 107.304-1(1959). The business policies of the SBIC must be stated in its 'proposal."
See note 14 supra.
32. Ibid.
33. See 72 Stat. 690, 15 U.S.C. § 671 (1958); S. REP. No. 1652, supra
note 3, at 9.
34. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
35. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
36. See note 31 supra and accompan'ying text.
37. 72 Stat. 694, 15 U.S.C. § 686 (1958).
149
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dealing with themselves to the prejudice of other shareholders.'
The exercise of such regulatory power promotes SBIC develop-
ment because persons are more likely to invest in a company whose
operations are subject to the control of a governmental agency.
In order to discover violations of SBID regulations and of SBIA
provisions, the SBID is empowered to examine each SBIC and to
require such reports as shall be necessary to facilitate its power of
examination.39 When in the judgment of the SBID a company
has violated or is about to violate the SBIA or a regulation is-
sued thereunder, the SBID may seek an injunction in any United
States District Court.4" In addition, the SBIC which violates such
a provision or regulation may lose its license to operate under the
SBIA.4- However, before an SBIC loses its license, the company
must be adjudged guilty of the alleged violation by a United States
Court.42
II. PROVISIONS OF THE 1940 ACT
SIGNIFICANT FOR SBICs
A. THE EXTENT TO WHICH SBICs ARE REGULATED BY THE 1940a
ACT
The 1940 act defines the term "investment company" as an or-
ganization formed for the purpose of investing, trading, or holding
securities.43 Any company which falls within this definition and is
not registered under the 1940 act is prohibited from selling its own
securities or purchasing the securities of another person by means
of the mails or any other instrumentality of interstate commerce. 4
An unregistered investment company is also prohibited from en-
gaging in any business in interstate commerce or controlling any
company which carries on business in interstate commerce.45
38. 13 C.F.R. § 107.306-1(b) (1959). See notes 133-36 infra and ac-
companying text for a discussion of other investor protections provided
by SBID regulations.
39. 72 Stat. 695, 15 U.S.C. § 687(c) (1958).
40. 72 Stat. 695, 15 U.S.C. § 687(e) (1958).
41. 72 Stat. 695, 15 U.S.C. § 687(d) (1958).
42. Ibid.
43.
"[I]nvestment company" means any issuer which-(1) is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or proposes
to engage primarily, in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading
in securities; ....
54 Stat. 797 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a) (1958).
44. 54 Stat. 802 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-7(a)(1)-(2) (1958). Such
an investment company is also prohibited from controlling a company
which does either of these two acts. 54 Stat. 802 (1940), 15 U.S.C.§ 80a-7(a) (3) (1958).
45. 54 Stat. 802 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-7(a)(4)-(5) (1958).
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Other investment companies may register under the 1940 act, but
they are not required to do so as long as their activities are con-
fined to intrastate commerce.46 Since SBICs primarily invest in
and hold small business securities, they come within the 1940 act's
definition of an investment company. Thus, the SBIC is within the
regulatory power of the 1940 act unless the particular company
confines its activities to intrastate commerce. However, it would
seem that the practical effects of not being able to use the mails
or other instrumentalities of interstate commerce would encour-
age most SBICs to register under the 1940 act. Otherwise, the
company's business operations would probably be curtailed or at
least impeded.
The 1940 act, however, does provide specific exemptions for
certain investment companies which otherwise would fall within
its regulatory power.4 7 One such exemption-which is clearly ap-
plicable to the SBIC-provides that any investment company
whose securities are beneficially owned by not more than 100 per-
sons and which does not have, or presently contemplate making,
a public issue is exempt from the 1940 act. 8 Therefore, an
SBIC may be initially outside the regulatory power of the 1940
act and subject only to the provisions of the SBIA. But if the
SBIC later increases its total shareholders to more than 100 be-
cause of growth or a public issue, it will then come under the reg-
ulation of both the 1940 act and the SBIA.49
B. SPECIFIC ABUSES CONCERNING INVESTMENT COMPANIES
WHICH THE 1940 ACT SOUGHT TO PREVENT
The investment company as it existed. prior to 1940 represented
a means by which amounts of capital could be gathered from
many small investors so as to obtain -the benefits of large scale
expert investment. 0 On many occasions a small group of indi-
viduals with little personal investment gained control of the in-
46. 54 Stat. 802 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-7-8 (1958).
47. See 54 Stat. 797 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-3(b)-(c) (1958) for a
list of the types of companies exempt from the 1940 act.
48. 54 Stat. 798 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c) (1) (1958).
In order to be exempt, both of these conditions must be fulfilled by the
SBIC. Beneficial ownership by a company is deemed to be ownership
by one person unless the company owns more than 10% of the issuer's
securities in which case ownership is by the owning company's security
holders. Ibid.
49. A potential problem area under this exemption is that of determin-
ing when an SBIC has presently proposed a public issue. The SEC, which
is charged with administering the 1940 act, could expand its scope of con-
trol considerably by liberally construing this phrase.
50. See Note, 41 COLUm. L. Rnv. 269 (1941).
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vestment company and used its resources for their own benefit
rather than that of the investment company's shareholders.51 The
1940 act was passed primarily to prevent this abusive use of pow-
er by those in control of investment companies. 2 These abuses
can be divided into four categories.
1. Failure to Provide Adequate Information Concerning the In-
vestment Company's Activities
First of all, many investment companies failed to provide ade-
quate, accurate, and specific information concerning their business
policies and investments to their shareholders and prospective in-
vestors.53 Shareholders often had no effective voice in developing
the investment company's business policies because they were un-
able to discover what its existing policies were or what policy
changes were contemplated by those in control.5 Also, prospec-
tive investors could easily be misled as to the policies and condi-
tion of the investment company because of inadequate disclosure.
To remedy this abuse the 1940 act required all registered invest-
ment companies to file a registration statement with the SEC.5"
This statement, which is open for public inspection, 5 must state
the business policies to be followed by the investment company
and must also list the names, addresses, and business experience
of the company's management.5 7 Investment companies must
also submit semi-annual reports to their shareholders showing the
51. S. REP. No. 1775, supra note 8, at 6-7.
See Tolins, The Investment Company Act of 1940, 26 CORNELL L.Q.
77, 84-85 (1940) for a discussion of the various ways by which such a
small group of individuals could gain control of the investment company.
52.
In the opinion of the committee, the Security and Exchange Com-
mission, and the industry itself, the legislation is needed to protect
small investors from breaches of trust upon the part of unscrupulous
managements and to provide such investors with a regulated institution
for the investment of their savings. This legislation will also prevent
those abuses which have damaged the reputation of the industry as
a whole.
H.R. REP. No. 2639, supra note 8, at 10.
53. The act explicitly states that its policy is to eliminate this abuse.
54 Stat. 790 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1(b) (1) (1958).
54. In many cases the lines of communication between the investment
company and its shareholders were so badly blocked that the shareholders
were unable to determine who actually controlled the company. See Note,
88 U. PA. L. REv. 584, 590-91 (1940).
55. 54 Stat. 804 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8(b) (1958).
56. See Hearings on the Operations of the Small Business InvestmentCompany Act Before the Select Committee on Small Business of the United
States Senate, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1960).
57. 54 Stat. 804 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8(b)(3) (1958).
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financial condition and policies of the company."5 These reporting
requirements are implemented by the provisions which make it a
criminal offense to submit willingly any untrue, misleading, or
misrepresentative statements in any reports required by the 1940
act. 9
2. Improper Portfolio Management
Another abuse common to investment companies was port-
folio management in the interest of those in control rather than
the shareholders.6" For example, a favorite quick profit activity
of investment company managers was to issue new stock to them-
selves below the net asset value 1 of the company's other stock.
The new stock would then be sold on the open market62 or re-
deemed by the company at the net asset value resulting in a quick
profit for the managers.6 To prevent this mismanagement, the is-
suance of securities below net asset value of the company's other
shares is prohibited by the 1940 act. 4 Another example of im-
proper portfolio management involved the purchase of stock from
58. 54 Stat. 836-37 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-29(d) (1958). The 1940
act lists various types of reports and authorizes the SEC to designate which
of these the investment companies must submit to its shareholders. Some
of the statements listed are a balance sheet, a list showing the amounts
and values of securities owned, an income statement, and a statement of
surplus. Ibid.
In addition, the source of any dividend payment must be disclosed to
stockholders. See 54 Stat. 821 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-19 (1958). This
prevents a company from paying dividends to shareholders to convey the
impression that there have been substantial earnings when actually these
dividends have been paid out of the company's assets.
59. 54 Stat. 840 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-33(b) (1958). See 54 Stat.
842 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-41 (1958) which describes the means by
which the 1940 act is enforced and 54 Stat. 846 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
48 (1958) which describes the penalties imposed on those who violate the
1940 act.
60. See S. REP. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 6-7 (1940); Note, 88
U. PA. L. REv. 584, 590-91 (1940).
61. The "net asset value" of a share of stock is the total value of the
company's assets less its liabilities divided by the total number of the com-
pany's outstanding shares. See S. REP. No. 1293, supra note 29, at 21,
which raises the problem of how an SBIC values its securities when cal-
culating the net asset value of its stock.
62. The market value of a share of stock is usually close to that stock's
net asset value. Therefore, if a stock is issued below its net asset value the
issue price is probably also below the stock's market value. As a result, the
sale of such stock on the open market usually results in a quick net profit
to the seller.
63. See Motley, Jackson & Barnard, Federal Regulation of Investment
Companies Since 1940, 63 HIv. L. REv. 1134, 1144-46 (1950), for a dis-
cussion of the prevalent abuses resulting from the issuance of securities
below net asset value of other shares.
64. 54 Stat. 825 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-23(b) (1958).
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those in control of the investment company. It was common for
persons--especially brokers and investment advisors-to gain
control of a company by means of proxies and voting trusts and
then use the company as an unloading block for their own worth-
less securities.65 The 1940 act sought to prevent such misman-
agement by regulating the use of proxies and voting trusts66 and
by requiring that all stock issued must be voting stock.6" Also,
the self-dealing aspects of this abuse were dealt with by prohibit-
ing companies from purchasing securities from brokers, dealers,
or other persons affiliated with the investment company."s
3. Abuses Involving Investment Company Accounting Practices
A third major abuse prevalent among investment companies
was the use of unsound, misleading, and unsupervised accounting
practices.69 One problem in this area arose from the fact that the
65. See Note, 88 U. PA. L. REv. 584, 593 (1940).
66. 54 Stat. 822 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-20 (1958). See S. REP. No.
1775, supra note 60, at 7, and H.R. REP. No. 2639, supra note 8, for a dis-
cussion of abuses through pyramiding. See generally Tolins, supra note 51,
at 98-99 which advocates more stringent rules against pyramiding.
67. 54 Stat. 821 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(i) (1958).
68. 54 Stat. 807 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(f) (1958); 54 Stat. 810
(1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(d) (3) (1958).
Additional provisions of the 1940 act attempting to prevent self-dealing
provide that at least a majority of a company's management cannot also
be the company's regular brokers or investment advisors. 54 Stat. 806
(1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(b) (1958). Section 10(d) of the 1940 act
makes certain exceptions to § 10(b). In addition § 10(c) provides that a
majority of the board of directors cannot be directors of a single bank.
Section 10(e) lays out the procedure for filling vacancies on the board to
prevent the board of directors from becoming self-perpetuating. To further
insure that a company's directors are free from a divided or conflicting
interest the 1940 act provides that only 60% of the company's directors can
be investment advisors or their affiliates, officers or directors of the invest-
ment company. 54 Stat. 806 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80(a) (1958). However,
self-dealing is most effectively prevented by the provisions which require
that all directors be elected by a majority of voting shares, 54 Stat. 813
(1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-16(a) (1958), and that the employment contracts
of advisors and managers be controlled by the directors and shareholders.
54 Stat. 812 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a) (1958).
Senior security holders also found themselves being victimized by invest-
ment companies which sold large amounts of senior securities but failed to
protect the rights of these holders. Thus, the 1940 act prohibited a company
from issuing senior securities unless specific asset coverages of these securi-
ties existed. 54 Stat. 817 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(a) (1958). The asset
coverage requirements of the 1940 act provide such holders with a meas-
ure of security to insure their payment at the proper time. The act also
provided that senior security holders should elect a majority of the com-
pany's board of directors if a dividend default occurred for two consecu-
tive years and that no dividends should be issued unless a specified asset
coverage of these securities existed. Ibid.
69. See Note, 88 U. PA. L. REv. 584, 605-06 (1940).
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various investment companies did not follow uniform accounting
procedures."° As a result investors found it difficult to compare
effectively, (1) the accounting reports of a particular investment
company, or (2) the reports of one company, with those of an-
other unless they were thoroughly familiar with the accounting pro-
cedures of the companies involved. Moreover, accounting methods
could be adopted which would mislead the public as to the com-
pany's financial condition. For example, a company's accounting
procedures could be changed by the company's management when
it thought that its financial position could thereby be presented
more favorably. Thus, in many cases only those persons most inti-
mately connected with the company knew its actual financial
status. To correct this situation, the 1940 act empowered the SEC
to compel investment companies to keep such records and accounts
as the SEC should deem necessary.7 The SEC may also issue
regulations prescribing the accounting policies and principles to
be followed in order to insure a reasonable degree of uniformity
among investment companies. 72 Shareholders are assured of hav-
ing ultimate control over the company's accounting policies by the
1940 act's requirement that the investment company's controller or
principal accounting officer must be chosen by its board of di-
rectors or shareholders and not merely by its executives. 73
4. Abuses Involved in Changing the Business Policy of the In-
vestment Company
A further abuse was the practice by some investment companies
of changing their business policies without the consent of their
70. Ibid.
71. 54 Stat. 838 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-30(a) (1958).
Also the SEC can require the company's investment advisors, principle
underwriters, and depositors to keep certain records, accounts, and other
documents which are necessary and appropriate to record such person's
transactions with the investment company. Ibid. All these records and re-
ports are open to inspection by the SEC at any reasonable time. 54
Stat. 838 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-30(b) (1958). In addition, the 1940 act
provides that it is unlawful to make any untrue, misleading, or misrepresen-
tative statements in these records or reports. 54 Stat. 840 (1940), 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-34(b) (1958).
72. 54 Stat. 838 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-30(c) (1958).
73. 54 Stat. 839 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-31(b) (1958).
Two additional means of shareholder control over a company's ac-
counting policies are provided by the 1940 act. First, the act provides pro-
Cedure by which the selection and control of the investment company's
certified public accountant is in the hands of its shareholders. See 54 Stat.
838 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-31(a) (1958). Second, the act requires that
all auditor reports must be directed to shareholders as well as directors.
54 Stat. 838 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-31(a) (1958).
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shareholders.74 Investors are often persuaded to invest in a com-
pany because of its reputation for making certain types of invest-
ments. 5 Many times these companies would abruptly change their
investment policy and, thus, the investor who relied on the com-
pany's previous investment policies held an unwanted investment. 6
Such an abrupt change in the type of securities held by an in-
vestment company could be accomplished easily because most
companies held extremely liquid securities. The investment policy
change often caused the market value of the company's stock to de-
cline. As a result, the investor who desired to sell his unwanted
stock was forced to take a loss. 77 The 1940 act attempted to
ameliorate this situation by requiring that a company's classifica-
tion"5 and business policy be set forth in its registration statement
at the time of organization.79 Prospective investors are thereby
able to determine accurately what type of investment policies a
particular company proposes to follow. In addition, the 1940 act
provides that the business policy set forth in this classification can
be changed only by a majority vote of all shareholders."0
C. THE FUNCTION OF THE SEC UNDER THE 1940 ACT
The powers and duties of the SEC under the 1940 act fall into
three general categories. First, the SEC is given broad authority
to issue regulations which interpret specific sections of the act."'
The SEC also has power to exempt any investment company from
its regulations and the 1940 act if the commission feels that the
interest of investors will continue to be protected. 2 Second, the
SEC has the duty to collect all reports and records which the
act requires investment companies to file." Finally, enforcement
of the 1940 act is vested in the SEC. In order to facilitate enforce-
74. See Note, The Investment Act of 1940, 50 YALE L.J 440, 444-46(1941) for a discussion of the injurious results of such changes.
75. See S. REP. No. 1775, supra note 60, at 7. The electronics and air-
craft industries are good examples of the type of investment which today
would attract investors. The rapid advances made in these two industries
and the resulting favorable publicity have made them very attractive to in-
vestors.
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid.
78. The 1940 act divides investment companies into three main classifi-
cations and various sub-classifications in order to provide special regulations
for each type of investment company. See 54 Stat. 799 (1940), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 80a-4-5 (1958). Thus, by knowing a particular company's classification
it is possible to determine many of its business characteristics and policies.
79. 54 Stat. 804 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8(b) (1958).
80. 54 Stat. 811 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-13 (1958).
81. E.g., 54 Stat. 841 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-37(a) (1958).
82. 54 Stat. 801 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-6(b) (1958).
83. 54 Stat. 836 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-29 (1958).
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ment, the commission has extensive powers to carry on investiga-
tions of possible violations of the act."' 'If the commission believes
that a violation is being, or will shortly be, committed, it is em-
powered to seek an injunction against the offending party in any
United States District Court.85 The SEC may also transmit any
evidence it has concerning such a violation to the United States
Attorney General who may, in his discretion, institute criminal
proceedings against the offender."6
I. ANALYSIS OF THE APPLICATION OF
THE 1940 ACT TO SBICs
At first glance it seems clear that if SBICs are investment com-
panies they should properly come within the regulation of the
1940 act. In fact, the legislative history of the SBIA clearly indi-
cates that Congress intended the 1940 act to apply to SBICs87
However, a great many well-informed observers feel that SBICs
should not be regulated by the 1940 act.8 Their position is not
that SBICs should be unregulated but rather that the 1940 act is
not the proper means for such regulation. 9
A. GENERAL POLICY GROUNDS FOR EXEMPTING SBICs FROM
THE REGULATION OF THE 1940 ACT
The regulatory provisions of the 1940 act were directed par-
ticularly at the mutual fund type investment company" which was
84. 54 Stat. 842 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-41(a)-(d) (1958).
85. 54 Stat. 843 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-4.1(e) (1958).
86. Ibid.
87. For example, the Report of the Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency on the SBIA states:
The bill also provides that with one exception, the Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940 shall apply to small business investment companiesjust as it does at present to other investment companies. The commit-
tee was impressed by the testimony offered by the Chairmen of the
SEC, that, in order to give adequate protection to investors, the In-
vestment Company Act of 1940 should be applicable to small busi-
ness investment companies.
S. REP. No. 1652, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1958). Moreover, no amend-
ment to the 1940 act specifically exempts SBICs from the act's regulation
although such exemptions have been extended to banks, insurance com-
panies, and underwriters. See 54 Stat. 798, 800 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-
3(c), 80a-6 (1958) for a complete list of these exemptions.
88. See, e.g., the statement of Lee Davis, President, Tennessee Investors,
Inc., Nashville, Tenn., in Hearings, supra note 56, at 209.
89. See statement of Elliot Davis, President of the Alliance Business In-
vestment Co., Tulsa, Oklahoma. Id. at 161.
90. "Mutual fund investment company" as used in this Note designates
the type of investment company prevalent at the time the 1940 act was
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prevalent in 1940.91 As a result, it has been contended that
SBICs should be exempt from the 1940 act since they differ so
completely from the mutual fund type investment company. 2 In
fact, Wendell B. Barnes, former administrator of the Small Busi-
ness Administration, has asserted that the question of the appli-
cability of the 1940 act to SBICs would never have arisen had they
not been called "investment companies."93
Upon examination it becomes clear that substantial differences
do exist between the SBIC and the mutual fund company. For
example, the mutual fund company was formed so that small in-
vestors might pool their funds and thereby gain the advantages of
diversified investments and expert portfolio management.94 These
companies traditionally invest in the conservative marketable se-
curities of large corporations. Thus, such companies are able to
satisfy the small investor who, because of his limited resources,
desires safe investments with a uniform rate of return.15 On the
other hand, SBICs are formed primarily to aid small businesses by
furnishing these concerns with venture and expansion capital
through the purchase of their securities."5 These securities are
typically unlisted.97 In addition, they are not readily marketable
because they represent investments in small business and often are
extremely speculative and risky. Thus, the primary purposes and
the investment policies of each of these companies are substantially
different. A second major difference between these two types of
investment companies is in the type of investor they attract. The
mutual fund type company tends to attract the inexperienced in-
vestor who because of his lack of investment knowledge desires
passed and includes both open and closed end companies. These companies
were organized primarily so that small investors could pool their resources
for investment purposes. As a result, these investors are able to obtain the
benefits of large scale investing and expert management. See notes 94 and
95 infra and accompanying text for a further discussion of the characteris-
tics of this type investment company.
91. See Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Banking
and Currency of the United States Senate, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 230-31,
308 (1959).
92. Id. at 231.
93. Id. at 114. In addition Stephen A. Calder, Vice President, National
Association of Small Business Investment Companies, states that members
of his association who have discussed the matter with SEC officials report
that they base their jurisdiction over SBICs on the fact that they are call-
ed "investment companies." Id. at 163.
94. See Jasetzki, The Investment Company Act of 1940, 26 WASH. U.
L.Q. 303, 305 (1941).
95. See Hearings, supra note 91, at 308.
96. See id. at 195.
97. Ibid.
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to place his funds in the hands of an expert manager.9 s In con-
trast, the speculative nature of SBIC investments tends to attract
the knowledgeable investor with large resources who seeks the
speculative but potentially large profits and the tax advantages99
afforded the SBIC investor.' In addition, the SBIC and mutual
fund company differ in their methods of investing funds. The
SBIC deals personally with the individual small business in ne-
gotiating financial arrangements whereas the mutual fund com-
pany makes its investments by purchasing securities of publicly
held corporations on the open market. Although the differences
between the two types of investment companies are substantial,''
it would be inaccurate to say that it is impossible for the 1940 act
to regulate both types of companies effectively. However, these
differences should arouse doubt as to whether the 1940 act can
effectively protect investors and still promote the policies of the
SBIA.
The effect of applying the 1940 act to SBICs may be illustrated
by analyzing specific provisions of the act. First of all, the 1940 act
prohibits registered investment companies from using voting
trusts'02 and allows proxy voting only in accordance with SEC
regulations. 0 3 One of the reasons for these restrictions was to pre-
98. See S. REP. No. 1293, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1960).
99. Numerous tax advantages are afforded to SBICs and those who in-
vest in them. First of all, stockholders in an SBIC are allowed an ordinary
rather than a capital loss deduction for losses on the sale or exchange of
SBIC stock. Treas. Reg. § 1.1242-1(a) (1960). Second, the SBIC itself is
allowed an ordinary loss deduction for losses incurred in the sale or ex-
change of the convertible debentures or stock obtained from a small busi-
ness. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 243. The SBIC is also granted a 100%
deduction for the dividends which it receives from small businesses. INT.
REV. CODE OF 1954, § 243 (b). In addition, the SBIC is exempted from the
personal holding company surtax. Treas. Reg. § 1.542(c) (1960). Finally,
earnings and profits of the SBIC are not subject to the accumulated earn-
ings surtax if they are reinvested in small business loans and converti-
ble debentures. Treas. Reg. § 1.533-1(d) (1960). See Evans, Developments
in Small Business Law, 15 Bus. LAw. 979-80 (1960); 14 Bus. LAW.
1152-53 (1959), for a further discussion of these tax advantages. See
S. REP. No. 1293, supra note 98, at 17-18 for a discussion of proposed
changes in tax law which relates to SBICs.
100. See S. REP. No. 1293, supra note 98, at 21.
101. In regard to these differences, George Miller Jr., President, Balti-
more Investment Company made the following statement:
You might say that the 1940 Investment Company Act was designed
to regulate companies which naturally and spontaneously sprang into
being to help enlarge and enhance the existing equity capital facilities
of big business, while the Small Business Investment Act of 1958 was
found necessary to initiate equity capital facilities for small business.
Hearings, supra note 91, at 237.
102. 54 Stat. 822 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-20(b) (1958).
103. 54 Stat. 822 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-20(a) (1958).
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vent the abuses which resulted when individuals with little personal
investment used voting trusts and proxies to gain control of a
company. For example, as described earlier, brokers often gained
control of investment companies, and used such control to enhance
their own brokerage businesses rather than to benefit the share-
holders of the investment companies.' Since brokerage profits
are derived primarily from purchasing and selling securities, it
would seem unlikely that a broker would gain substantially from
controlling an SBIC because its investments consist largely of
small business securities which usually are not readily marketable.
Another abuse which the 1940 act sought to prevent was the
use of voting trusts and proxies in order to pyramid and, thus,
gain substantial control over a complete industry.10 5 But since
SBICs invest only in small business securities it is unlikely that
substantial control over a significant industry could be obtained
through an SBIC. Of course, it is possible that the abuses relating
to proxies and voting trusts could occur in an SBIC. However,
if a small business is to be aided effectively, restrictions should
not be placed on SBIC operations until the possibility of these
abuses materializes or at least threatens to materialize. The 1940
act, as now applied to SBICs, imposes restrictions on the functions
of an SBIC whether the abuse sought to be prevented is a mere
possibility or presents an actual danger.
A further example of the restrictive regulation of SBICs is
found in the 1940 act's requirements that securities owned by an
SBIC be held under a custodial agreement." 6 In order to satisfy
the custodial requirement, the SBIC must deposit its securities
with a bank or with a company which belongs to a security ex-
change, or it must retain them in accordance with SEC rules.07
These SEC rules may require segregation, hypothecation, ear-
marking, or inspection of an SBIC's security holdings."" The ap-
parent reason for this provision is to restrict access to a company's
securities and, thus, prevent certain individuals from using the se-
curities for their own benefit." 9 For example, a favorite profit-
making device of investment company brokers was to buy and
sell securities at a rapid rate without regard to the necessity of such
action in order to realize the brokerage commissions paid by the
104. See note 65 supra and accompanying text; H.R. REP. No. 2639,
supra note 66, at 8.
105. See notes 65-67 supra and accompanying text; Note, 88 U. PA. L.
REv. 584, 593 (1940).
106. 54 Stat. 816 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(f) (1958).
107. Ibid.
108. Ibid.
109. See Note, 41 COLUM. L. REv. 269, 292-94 (1941).
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investment company. °10 The fact that most securities held by
mutual fund investment companies were extremely liquid and ne-
gotiable made it easy to accomplish such an abuse.11' This cus-
todial provision not only handicaps an SBIC by limiting its access
to the securities it holds, but also, the SBIC is forced to incur ad-
ditional legal counsel and custodial expenses in order to comply
with the provision. Furthermore, the burdens imposed on SBICs
by the custodial requirement are not justified since the danger of
mishandling the securities of an SBIC is reduced substantially by
the fact that SBICs invest in small business securities which are
relatively unmarketable.
Probably the regulation most harmful to SBICs is the 1940
act provision which prohibits investment companies from issuing
stock options unless they are issued ratably to a class or classes of
the company's security holders and expire within 120 days of the
date of their issue." As a result, SBICs which come under the
1940 act are not allowed to use stock options as a means of
compensating their executives. The stock option, however, is an
extremely valuable means by which the newly formed SBIC can
obtain the experienced executives needed to guide the company's
development. Many embryonic SBICs are unable to pay their exe-
cutives competitive salaries because of a lack of cash. Stock op-
tions provide these companies with a means of adequately com-
pensating their executives. They are also beneficial to the SBIC
which is able to pay adequate salaries because the company can
retain its cash for use in small business investments. Moreover,
most experienced executives prefer stock option compensation
rather than cash because the option allows them to participate in
the future prosperity of the company-the product of their own
labor.1 3 Thus, since other businesses use stock options, SBICs
under the 1940 act may be placed at a disadvantage in their at-
tempts to secure and hold experienced executives. However, many
persons consider stock options undesirable because additional shares
of stock are thereby issued while the total assets of the company
do not rise proportionally. Thus, there is a dilution of stock which
existed prior to the option issue because the asset value of each
share is reduced." 4 It is also argued that insiders may be able to
110. See H.R. REP. No. 2639, supra note 8, at 8.
111. See Note, 41 COLUM. L. REv. 269, 292-94 (1941).
112. 54 Stat. 819 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(d) (1958). One exception
to this rule is that an option may be issued for outstanding options in con-
nection with a plan of reorganization. Ibid.
113. See Hearings, supra note 56, at 38, 90 & 161.
114. See Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 3 of the Committee on
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manipulate control of the company by issuing stock options to
specific individuals so that they might thereafter hold a majority of
the company's outstanding shares." 5 But these objections could
be satisfied by amending the SBIA to provide that the sharehold-
ers must approve all stock options issued by a company;"' thus,
shareholders are afforded an opportunity to protect themselves
against any abusive use of the option by insiders." 7
These provisions of the 1940 act point out the possible arbi-
trariness of applying the 1940 act to the SBIC. There is little
doubt that SBICs are subject to the same type of abuse which the
1940 act sought to prevent among mutual fund investment compa-
nies. But the primary purpose in formulating the 1940 act was to
protect investors in mutual fund companies."' On the other hand,
the interest in investor protection must be balanced against a sec-
ond interest not encountered in mutual fund companies-that of
encouraging the formation and development of SBICs so that they
might aid small business. Thus, it is difficult to assert dogmatically
that the provisions of the 1940 act should apply to SBICs with-
out considering the strong policy favoring SBIC growth. It would
seem that the provisions of the 1940 act are too inflexible to apply
to SBICs without considering their individual problems.
B. THE EFFECT AND DESIRABILITY OF THE DUAL REGULATION
OF SBICs PROVIDED BY THE SBIA AND THE 1940 ACT
Perhaps the most pressing reason SBICs seek exemption from
the 1940 act is that it brings them within the jurisdiction of a sec-
ond agency-the SEC. As a result, the following undesirable situ-
ation arises. SBICs which have less than 100 shareholders and do
not have or contemplate a public issue of their securities are regu-
lated by the SBID." 9 However, if an SBIC attempts to expand
by means of a public issue or by an increase in its total number of
shareholders to more than 100, it comes within the provisions of
the 1940 act and is therefore subject to the regulation of both the
Banking and Currency of the House of Representatives on S. 2611, 86th
Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1960).
115. See Hearings, supra note 56, at 29-30.
116. See Hearings, supra note 114, at 47-48. Such a provision requi.r-
ing stockholder approval of all stock option issues by a corporation is m-
cluded in the Minnesota corporation laws. See MINN. STAT. §§ 301.14(6)-(7) (1957). However, some states provide no checks on the issuance of stock
options. See BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 516 n.77 (1946).
117. See BALLANTINE, op. cit. supra note 116, at 512-16; STEVENS,
CORPORATIONS 523-25 (1949); Ballantine, Options vs. Ownership, 25 N.Y.
S.B. BULL. 171 (1953) for a general discussion of stock options.
118. See S. REP. No. 1293, supra note 98, at 21.
119. 54 Stat. 798 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1) (1958).
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SEC and SBID. This latter situation requires an SBIC to comply
with two sets of regulations which necessitates duplication of effort
in particular situations. When a group of individuals desires to
form an SBIC which comes within the jurisdiction of the 1940 act
it must file statements concerning the proposed company which
meet the approval of both the SBID and SEC.21 In addition, such
an SBIC is required to file semi-annual financial reports with each
agency; they require similar information."2 The SEC and SBID
are authorized to require the keeping of such books and accounts
as each shall deem necessary. 2 Consequently, it is possible that
a particular SBIC might be required to keep two separate sets of
accounts in order to satisfy both the SEC and SBID requirements.
SBIC officials claim that such duplication is expensive and time
consuming-especially for the embryonic SBIC with little cash and
a small clerical staff. 3 The SBIC under the 1940 act is also re-
quired to submit to examination by both the SEC and SBID. 4
120. The 1940 act requires an SBIC to file a statement containing in-
formation concerning the proposed business policy of the investment com-
pany. In addition, the statement must include the names and addresses of
the company's officers and directors and a disclosure of the business ex-
perience of each officer and director. See 54 Stat. 804 (1940), 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-8(b) (1958). See notes 13-19 supra and accompanying text for a
statement of the registration requirements under the SBIA.
See Hearings, supra note 91, at 148 for a listing of the typical forms
required to be filed by an SBIC.
121. The 1940 act requires that reports concerning the investments and
condition of the SBIC as the SEC shall require must be filed with the SEC.
See 54 Stat. 836 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-29(b) (1958). The SBID requires
that such information as it shall require concerning the SBIC's activities
and the securities it holds shall be filed with the SBID. See 13 C.F.R. §
107.308-5 (1959). As a result the SBIC is forced to make two different
disclosures although essentially the same information is required by each
agency. The burden of this disclosure would be considerably lightened if
both agencies required identical reports because only a duplication of a sin-
gle report would have to be made.
Section 308(c) of the SBIA provides that the SBID may exempt SBICs
registered under the 1940 act from reporting requirements to the extent
necessary to avoid duplication in reporting requirements. See 72 Stat. 695,
15 U.S.C. § 687(c) (1958). However, the practical operation of this section
offers little relief to SBICs from dual reporting and filing requirements.
Since the SBID has substantial regulatory power and responsibility over
SBICs, it is naturally reluctant to abdicate this power which facilitates
the discharge of its duties.
122. 54 Stat. 836 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-30 (1958) (authorizes
SEC to require such accounts as it deems necessary); 13 C.F.R. §
107.302-3 (1959) (requires SBICs to keep such records consistent with
good accounting principles).
123. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 91, at 148.
124. 72 Stat. 695, 15 U.S.C. § 687(c) (1958) (examination by the
SBID); 54 Stat. 836 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-30 (1958) (examination by
the SEC).
19611
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
In addition such an SBIC must have loans to its "affiliated per-
sons"'125 approved by both the SEC and SBID.12 As a result of
this duplication of control, SBICs are discouraged from expand-
ing127 and investors are reluctant to form, and to invest in,
SBICs. 2 s Both of these results are clearly contrary to the SBIA's
purpose of encouraging the development of SBICs." 9 Further-
more, most SBIC managers agree that a company must have ac-
cess to large resources in order to serve its customers adequately.15 0
Certainly, it is difficult to amass large resources without coming
under the regulatory provisions of the 1940 act. However, the re-
sulting dual regulation might well deter an SBIC from expanding
and reaching its optimum point of satisfactory operation.
However, the most burdensome situation which results from
dual regulation arises when the two agencies issue conflicting reg-
ulations on the same problem. These complications are illustrated
by each agency's regulations concerning stock options. The SBID
has provided that SBICs under its jurisdiction may utilize stock op-
tions to compensate their employees.'' However, as stated earlier,
the 1940 act does not allow stock options to be used for this pur-
pose. 32 Consequently, an SBIC not within the jurisdiction of
the 1940 act may use stock options as a means of compensat-
ing its employees. But the same SBIC will be precluded from is-
suing further stock options when it later contemplates a public is-
sue or expands its list of stockholders to more than 100. As a re-
sult, an SBIC's right to issue stock options is not determined by
balancing the need for such a compensatory device in promoting
125. See 54 Stat. 791 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(3) (1958), for a
definition of the term "affiliated person."
126. 54 Stat. 815 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17 (1958); 13 C.F.R.§ 107.306-1(b) (1959).
127. See Hearings, supra note 91, at 159-61.
128. Id. at 162-63.
129. 72 Stat. 689, 15 U.S.C. § 661 (1958).
130. See, e.g., the testimony of Charles E. Salik, President, Electronics
Capital Corporation, San Diego, California, before the Select Committee
on Small Business where he states that five million dollars is the minimum
economic size for an SBIC. Hearings, supra note 56, at 40.
The main reason an SBIC needs large resources is the fact that the SBIA
provides that an SBIC cannot loan more than 20% of its total capital and
surplus to any one small business concern without the approval of the ad-
ministration. 72 Stat. 694, 15 U.S.C. § 686 (1958). Thus, in order to satisfy
the substantial needs of a single concern, an SBIC must have large re-
sources.
131. 25 Fed. Reg. 7276 (1960), amending 13 C.F.R. § 107.302-2(b)
(1959).
132. 54 Stat. 819 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(d) (1958).
Although the SEC has power under § 6(b) of the 1940 act to exempt
SBICs from this provision, it has steadfastly refused to do so. See Hearings,
supra note 91, at 29-3 1.
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the growth of the SBIC against the need for investor protection.
Instead, it is determined by the arbitrary factor of whether the
SBIC contemplates a public issue or has more than 100 share-
holders. Such an arbitrary classification fails to weigh the relative
merits of the stock option device as used by an SBIC.
Another problem is posed by the SBID's and the SEC's incon-
sistent views on stock options issued by an SBIC prior to its com-
ing within the jurisdiction of the 1940 act. Edward N. Gadsby,
former chairman of the SEC, believes that when an SBIC comes
under the coverage of the 1940 act it would have to make ar-
rangements to eliminate its stock options. 3 3 If this view is adopt-
ed, an SBIC with a stock option plan will be forced to violate
such agreements with its executives in order to comply with the
act. Therefore, SBIC executives fearing loss of their stock option
rights might well be encouraged to oppose any expansion plan
which might bring them under the 1940 act. If such a conflict of
interest materializes, it is likely that SBICs will find it difficult
to develop properly.
C. TnE DESIRABILITY OF PLACING SOLE REGULATORY CONTROL
OF SBICs IN ONE AGENCY
As a result of the difficulties which arise when the 1940 act is
applied to SBICs, it has been suggested that the regulation of
SBICs be centered in one specialized regulatory body. At present,
since responsibility for regulating SBICs is placed in two agencies,
the SBIC is subjected to two regulatory policies. For example,
the SEC's major concern with SBICs coming within its jurisdiction
is the protection of investors. 3 The SEC is not responsible for
the over-all development of the SBIC program. As a result, its
regulations are likely to favor the investor to the detriment of
SBIC development. On the other hand, SBID regulations extend
to all areas of the SBIC program. In addition to its rulings con-
cerning the SBIC's general business operation,'35 the SBID issues
regulations providing for investor protection.'36 Therefore, the
SBID, in formulating its regulations, is likely to weigh the interest
of investor protection against the need to provide an atmosphere
conducive to the formation of SBICs; thus, all phases of the SBIC
program will be effectively implemented.
133. See Hearings, supra note 114, at 98.
134. See notes 50-52 supra and accompanying text.
135. See notes 33-37 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of
this type of regulation.
136. See notes 141-43 supra and accompanying text for examples of
this type of regulation.
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A second reason for centralizing the regulation of SBICs in one
agency is the need for individualized regulation. The type of in-
vestments made by different mutual fund companies are relatively
uniform and, thus, the arbitrary provisions of the 1940 act can
satisfactorily regulate these companies. However, the investment
policies of any two SBICs are seldom the same. SBICs are usually
formed by individuals possessing talents in a particular indus-
try. 37 For example, SBIC officials familiar with the chemical
industry ordinarily will concentrate their investments in that area
because they are better able to deal with and understand the needs
of chemical firms. Each SBIC must adjust its methods of financing
and operating the needs of the small business it seeks to aid. As a
result, SBICs develop individual problems which are often quite
different from those of mutual type investment companies. There-
fore, SBICs require regulation by an agency which is familiar with
the general problems of small business. In addition, the regulatory
agency should be empowered to exempt an SBIC from particular
regulations, if as a result of the exemption, that company's devel-
opment will be furthered without subjecting the SBIC to the harms
sought to be prevented by the regulation. Such a system of regula-
tion would clearly promote SBIC development more efficiently
than the 1940 act and still provide sufficient investor protection.
As an alternative to centralization of regulatory power, it has been
suggested that the existing regulation of the 1940 act be retained
and Congress should exempt SBICs from certain provisions of the
1940 act.138 But this would not solve the basic need of SBICs for
regulation by an agency which can mold its policies to fit the in-
dividual needs of the particular SBIC. Only an agency with ex-
tensive knowledge, experience, and flexibility in handling SBIC
problems can perform this function satisfactorily. Certainly Con-
gress does not possess such knowledge or experience nor could it
act with the necessary flexibility.
CONCLUSION
The SBID seems to be the agency best equipped to provide
both centralization and flexible regulation. The SBID currently has
complete responsibility for the formation and growth of SBICs 39
and, thus, it is in the best position to understand and provide for
the needs of small business. It has been contended that the SBID
is neither capable of, nor experienced in, providing SBIC investors
137. See Hearings, supra note 91, at 232-33.
138. See Hearings, supra note 114, at 94-95.
139. See notes 11-12 supra and accompanying text.
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with proper protection. 4 ' But the SB1D established its concern
for SBIC investors when it issued regulations for their protection.
For example, SBID regulations allow an SBIC to issue only one
class of stock,' and require that a particular SBIC's ratio of
indebtedness to paid-in capital and surplus shall not exceed four
to one without SBID approval." The SBID requires that an SBIC
submit financial statements covering its operations to its share-
holders every six months. Moreover, the SBID already has
personnel trained by the SEC in the SBID's programs of investor
protection. 44 Thus, the SBID would not be required to assume any
unfamiliar duties if it was given complete power to regulate SBICs.
Also, regulations issued by the SBID with complete responsibility
for the SBIC program would have the added virtue of being form-
ed with a broad view as to what is best for the SBIC program as
a whole as well as for the investor. In addition, the burdens of
dual regulation and the dangers of conflicting regulation would
be eliminated. Instead one philosophy for regulating the complete
SBIC program would emanate from one agency-the SBID. Cer-
tainly the promotion of SBICs and the protection of their investors
can best be obtained by such a result.
140. See the testimony of Edward N. Gadsby in Hearings, supra note
114, at 96.
141. See 25 Fed. Reg. 1397 (1960).
142. See 13 C.F.R. § 107.303-1 (1959).
143. See 13 C.F.R. § 107.302-3 (1959).
144. See Hearings, supra note 91, at 231.
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